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Abstract 
 Private not-for-profit organizations combine characteristics of a public sector 
agency with those of a private, proprietary firm.  In particular, nonprofits are required to 
address designated social missions while breaking even financially.  This structure 
underlies the difficulty that nonprofit organizations face in making decisions with 
important resource implications.  Specifically, choices that would achieve maximal 
mission impact may differ from choices that reward the organization in purely financial 
terms.  As result, nonprofit managers face a variety of trade-offs between mission-
responsive and financially rewarding actions.  This paper considers some of these trade-
offs by exploring how tensions between mission and market manifest themselves in a 
variety of nonprofit decision making applications.  The analysis is based on a set of task 
forces assembled by the National Center on Nonprofit Enterprise in eight areas of 
nonprofit decision making.   The paper suggests the development of metrics to reconcile 
mission goals with market incentives and research on appropriate nonprofit practices in 
areas such as pricing, employee compensation, outsourcing, collaboration, investment, 
fund raising and the undertaking of commercial ventures. 
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Introduction 
 Structurally, private not-for-profit organizations combine characteristics of a 
public sector agency with those of a private, proprietary firm.  In particular, nonprofits 
are required to address designated social missions while breaking even financially.  As a 
result, nonprofits are often described as having a “double bottom-line”, that is both a 
financial and programmatic standard by which their performance is to be assessed (Bell-
Rose, 2004; Clark et al, 2004).  In fact, from a normative point of view, the notion of a 
double-bottom line is misleading.  Achievement of the mission is the bottom line, while 
financial success may be prerequisite to such achievement.  While devices such as 
double-bottom lines or balanced scorecards (Kaplan and Norton,1996; Clark et al, 2004) 
may be helpful management tools, they can be counterproductive if allowed to obfuscate 
the ultimate criterion of success. 
 In terms of a positive theory, however, it is less clear how nonprofits actually 
behave.  As organizations they have a natural inclination to survive and grow, and their 
managers and leaders are as likely to be judged by standards of organizational 
sustainability and growth as by any objective measure of mission achievement.  This 
behavioral reality underlines the difficulty that nonprofit organizations face in making 
decisions with important resource implications (James, 1998).  Specifically, choices that 
would achieve maximal mission impact may differ from choices that reward the 
organization in purely financial terms.  As result, nonprofit managers require clear focus, 
strong discipline and appropriate measurements in order to keep to the normatively 
prescribed path, and they face a variety of trade-offs between mission-responsive and 
financially rewarding actions. 
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 Certainly nonprofits are not entirely unique in facing mission/market tensions and 
requiring a clear focus and direction.  For-profit businesses and governmental 
organizations also have missions and must sustain themselves economically.  And 
sometimes business or government executives will, for personal or other reasons, be 
dedicated to mission in ways that fail to align completely with maximum financial gain or 
to the prevailing political mandate that drives the allocation of public resources.  
However, mission/market tension is generally more wrenching for nonprofits because 
financial sustenance and mission achievement are less likely to be as congruent as they 
are in business or government.  In business, mission is generally instrumental to the 
ultimate goals of profit-making and wealth enhancement of owners and stockholders.  
Thus, missions are often adjusted or reframed with this in mind, usually without 
extraordinary conflict.  In government, agencies are charged with a mission through the 
same political process that allocates their resources, so tensions between mission and 
market (i.e. resource acquisition) may be restricted to bureaucratic enclaves which 
challenge the majority view.  For nonprofits, however, financial success is instrumental 
to the achievement of social mission, while the acquisition of financial resources often 
requires choices that can limit mission effectiveness.  For example, financial success can 
be enhanced by selling services to those who can better afford to pay, or by promoting 
causes that are popular with certain donors, although such actions may short change the 
social mission for which the organization may have been established.  Thus, special 
tensions are created that can pit organizational prosperity against mission achievement.     
 The purpose of this paper is to consider how tensions between mission and market 
manifest themselves in a variety of nonprofit decision making applications.  The primary 
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source of information is a set of reports of eight task forces assembled by the National 
Center on Nonprofit Enterprise (NCNE) to review the issues and challenges to nonprofits 
in eight different areas of nonprofit decision making (Young, 2004).  The conclusion of 
this analysis is that nonprofit managers must adopt a decision making framework that 
answers the following questions:  (1) To what extent does mission require the 
organization to survive and grow over time? (2) How does each potential activity or 
program undertaken by the organization contribute to mission and/or to net revenues? (3) 
What economic choices must be made for each such activity and how do alternative 
choices affect the activity’s mission and financial impact? And (4) what combination of 
activities leads to the largest overall impact on mission? 
 
Literature Review 
 Mission-market tension is not a new issue for nonprofits.  Indeed, it has been 
observed and studied in various forms over the past two decades, though with much 
greater attention since the 1990s.  The relevant research literature follows two main 
thrusts.  First, there are numerous studies that document the variety of manifestations of 
this tension in different fields of nonprofit service.  Second, there has been substantial 
effort devoted to helping resolve this tension by identifying ways of measuring nonprofit 
performance that would appropriately reconcile the concerns of addressing social mission 
while maintaining economic viability. 
 The literature on mission-market tensions can be traced to studies of nonprofit-
government relations and concerns about “vendorism” in the delivery of social services.  
Kramer (1981) was concerned that heavy reliance on government funding in the form of 
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purchase of service contracts would lead nonprofit social service agencies to become 
service delivery appendages to government and lose their independent perspectives as 
advocates for improvements in social welfare policy.  Young and Finch (1977), while 
documenting the internal motivating forces and private resources of nonprofit foster care 
agencies, also recognized the constraining factors on their mission-related behavior 
deriving from government per diem funding.  A general review of research on this 
subject by Kramer (1987) found “the dysfunctional consequences of agencies receiving 
public funds [namely] dependency, cooptation and a dilution of advocacy and autonomy, 
goal deflection and loss of an agency’s voluntaristic character through increased 
bureaucratization and professionalization” to be “considerably exaggerated” (p.247).   
However, these concerns continued to build and a key study by Smith and Lipsky (1993) 
expressed considerable alarm over the loss of independence and autonomy by nonprofit 
social service organizations as a result of the increased emphasis on contracting with 
government for service delivery. 
 Paradoxically, recent research studies have been more concerned with reductions 
and other changes in the public funding environment that have driven nonprofit social 
service organizations towards greater involvement in the private marketplace, with other 
mission vs. market consequences.  In particular, Alexander (1999) noted that, especially 
for smaller and medium sized community and faith-based nonprofit organizations,  
changes in government policies, including funding cutbacks, cost pressures deriving from 
new reporting and staffing requirements, opening of competition with for-profit suppliers, 
and a more distressed clientele population, have created financial pressures that force 
nonprofits to make mission-related compromises, including  raising prices, retrenching 
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certain services, redirecting services away from the neediest clients, and reducing 
emphasis on research, education and advocacy for client needs.  Indeed, similar coping 
strategies were documented by Liebschutz (1992) when funding cutbacks occurred 
during the Reagan administration.   
 The State of Nonprofit America project led by Lester Salamon (2002) made a 
special point of highlighting growing mission/market tensions in the nonprofit sector of 
the early twenty-first century.  The relevant trends include growing reliance on, and 
pervasiveness of, fee revenues, an increasingly entrepreneurial culture within the 
nonprofit sector, growing involvement of nonprofits with corporate partners, and 
intensifying competition with for-profit service providers.  With these forces in play, 
Salamon observes: “The move to the market may thus be posing a far greater threat to the 
nonprofit sector’s historic social justice and civic mission than the growth of government 
support before it.” (p.47). 
 Mission/market tensions appear to take different forms in different fields of 
service.  For example, in social services, consistent with the discussion above, Smith 
(2002) highlights increasing for-profit competition, the advent of managed care 
arrangements, and a new emphasis on performance measurement which requires 
nonprofits to focus on service output measures to the possible neglect of less quantifiable 
accomplishments in advocacy or work with more difficult clients for whom it is harder to 
show results.   In health care, Gray and Schlesinger (2002) note that increased 
competition with for-profit providers, and pressures from third party payers to control 
costs, have reduced the ability of nonprofits to devote resources to their traditional public 
service missions such as education and charity care.  These researchers cite a 
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convergence in the behaviors of for-profit and nonprofit providers, noting that “Even 
where nonprofits have maintained their role, they have often found it necessary to 
respond to the challenges confronting them in the health care field by becoming more like 
commercial enterprises.” (p.92).  Indeed, in the hospital field, the Senate Finance 
committee in the U.S. is now asking pointed questions of major institutions about the 
nature of their charitable work and the degree to which it may be compromised by 
market-oriented practices (Trefinger, 2005). 
 Parallel issues arise in higher education where Stewart, Kane and Scruggs (2002) 
find institutions struggling, in the context of escalating costs, to set tuitions that will 
allow good students of modest means to attend, and coping with new for-profit 
competitors and pressures from corporate funders to commercialize research.  Kirp’s 
(2003) in-depth study of the practices of a selected sample of U.S. universities expresses 
particular concern about the infusion of business values and mission orientation into 
American higher education. 
 In the arts, Wyszomiriski (2002) cites the uncertainty and instability of 
government funding, escalating costs, changes in technology and competition with the 
profit-making sector, as trends that continue to challenge nonprofit arts organizations.  In 
particular, pressures to increase earned income have resulted in “..changes in marketing, 
more emphasis on entrepreneurial activities, and a sharper concern for cultivating new 
audiences and new donors.” (p.191)  These developments are forcing nonprofit arts 
organizations to continually reconcile their mission foci with market incentives and 
pressures, and reappraise their relationships with the business sector and with for-profit 
arts organizations. 
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 Studies of mission/market tensions in nonprofits generally recognize the 
complexity of the issues and the challenges nonprofit managers face in dealing with them.   
Dees (1998), for example, argues that nonprofits span a wide spectrum of motivations 
and interests, ranging from philanthropic to commercial, and that this richness can be a 
source of innovation and increased capacity so long as social mission is kept firmly in 
mind.   Other authors such as Weisbrod (2004) and Foster and Bradach (2005) complain 
that nonprofits’ pursuit of commercial ventures is diverting these organizations from 
fulfilling their social missions.  A common theme in the literature is the need for 
nonprofits to maintain a clear identity and focus tied to social mission.  To do that, 
various authors cite the need for better means of measuring nonprofit performance in 
order to reconcile financial and mission-related performance.  For example, Bell-Rose 
(2004) suggests a social return on investment approach and the use of logic models to 
identify intermediary indicators that lead to desired social outcomes.  Anheier (2005) 
reviews several other generic approaches to nonprofit performance measurement, 
including Kendall’s and Knapp’s production of welfare framework, the balanced 
scorecard, corporate dashboards, benchmarking, and other sets of performance measures 
developed by umbrella organizations such as Independent Sector, the National Council of 
Voluntary Organizations, and United Way of America.  And Paton (2003) offers a 
comprehensive study of performance measurement in “social enterprises”.  An interesting 
dimension of Paton’s analysis is his inquiry into whether performance measurement itself, 
often encouraged or imposed by outside (market) agents, can compromise mission in the 
quest of better performance.  While Paton finds that the broader environment of nonprofit 
organizations does push them towards adopting methods of performance measurement, 
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he finds little evidence that this is problematic: “If the organizations were becoming more 
like each other and more like public agencies and private companies, this was not 
happening in ways that were either obvious or particularly burdensome.  This may yet 
happen….” (p.158). Still, Paton does take careful note of the reasons for concern: “..it can 
be argued on theoretical grounds that  the very reasons why activities are undertaken in 
the nonprofit sector are also the reasons why performance measurement will be deeply 
problematic (Krashinsky 1986; Hansmann 1987) (p.49).  This is a particularly acute 
observation, as the promise of appropriate performance metrics to reconcile nonprofit 
mission objectives with market pressures also contains the potential to make them worse 
by failing to account for mission-related benefits that are hard to measure, or by imposing 
uniformity from the outside. 
          
Methodology 
 The eight NCNE task forces, convened in 2001, were composed of leading 
nonprofit, business and foundation officials and scholars, each led by an academic 
chairperson.  The mandates of the task forces were to gain the benefits of multiple expert 
perspectives in key areas of nonprofit economic decision making; to articulate key issues 
and challenges; to apply rigorous analytic thinking to these issues; to offer practical 
information and advice based on theory, research and experience; and to identify key 
issues for further research.  The eight areas of decision making on which the task forces 
focused were: pricing of services, compensation of staff, outsourcing of activities and 
programs, spending on fund raising, investment and expenditure of funds, new ventures 
and venture philanthropy, institutional collaboration, and Internet commerce and fund 
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raising.  These areas, chosen through consensus after extensive discussions with members 
of NCNE’s board and advisory committees, were felt to reflect issues of high 
contemporary interest among nonprofits.  In each area, nonprofits are struggling with 
appropriate choices and strategies for effectively deploying scarce resources.  In fact, any 
area of nonprofit decision making that involves the allocation of scarce resources is likely 
to reflect difficult trade-offs between mission achievement and economic sustenance.  
However, the areas selected cover most of the important subcategories associated with 
the development of nonprofit resources on the one hand (e.g., pricing (fees), fund raising, 
returns on investment, and commercial ventures) and the expenditure of those resources 
on the other (compensation, outsourcing, collaboration, spending on programs and 
resource development initiatives).     
 The task forces each produced a report that was vetted at a national conference in 
January of 2002, appropriately revised, and then published as a book by the Foundation 
Center (Young, 2004).  In the process, the task force reports were examined for common 
themes and cross-cutting issues.  The tension between mission and market incentives is 
one of the prominent cross-cutting themes that emerged from this analysis.  Below, this 
tension is explored within each of the areas examined by the NCNE task forces.  First, 
however, it is logical to explore further the source and nature of this tension in general, 
and how it fits within a general conceptual framework for nonprofit economic decision 
making. 
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Conceptual Framework 
 While tensions certainly exist between financial return and mission-achievement 
in the nonprofit context, these goals are not in diametric opposition.  Given that 
nonprofits are intended to address a social mission, financial performance may be viewed 
as an instrumental variable contributing to that mission.  The degree to which financial 
success is required to achieve mission may indeed depend on the nature of the mission.  
In some cases, nonprofits may legitimately decide to use their resources in a time-limited 
manner to achieve some goal, and then disband when resources are depleted.  The 
Markey Trust provides one such illustration where a foundation (Dickason and 
Neuhauser, 2000) decided to concentrate its grant making for biomedical research over a 
limited period of time.   Similarly, the John M. Olin Foundation is intentionally closing 
up shop after having financed a generation of conservative intellectual programming 
(DeParle, 2005).  In these and other cases, part of the rationale for the time limitation was 
to concentrate resources on the mission, to avoid having that mission become obsolete, 
and to limit spending funds on maintaining a bureaucratic organization. 
 However, time-limited nonprofits are the exception rather than the rule.  The 
classic case of a nonprofit deciding to continue operations once the mission was achieved 
is the March of Dimes, which adopted a new mission to address birth defects once polio 
was cured (Bowen et al, 1994).  Here the rationale was that the existing organizational 
infrastructure represented valuable capital that could be effectively redeployed for a new, 
related mission.  Unfortunately, many nonprofits fail to address the desirability of 
sustainability and growth explicitly.  Many organizations die a slow death or slide into 
dormancy without ever determining if this was the best way to allocate charitable 
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resources.  Indeed, it is even hard to find official records of what happened to many 
nonprofit organizations that stopped reporting their operations or filing tax returns 
(Bowen et al, 1994). 
 Given that most nonprofits decide, implicitly or otherwise, that ongoing economic 
viability is a prerequisite to mission achievement, further understanding of their behavior 
can be developed through the theory of nonprofit organizations as multi-product firms – 
first proposed by James (1983) and later expanded by Weisbrod et al (1998).  In this 
framework, nonprofit organizations are viewed as producing two kinds of services – 
those which are profitable and help sustain the organization, and those which directly 
impact its mission and may require subsidy.  Assuming that managers of the organization 
intend to maximize its mission impact while maintaining its financial integrity, their 
challenge is to find just the right combination of these two types of activities.  Hence, in 
each instance they must determine what the objective of the activity is – profit or mission 
impact – and then design effective policies for its execution. 
 In reality, nonprofit activities are not necessarily cleanly separable into profit 
making and mission-focused activity.  Rather many nonprofit activities encompass both 
objectives in some combination.  For example, a fund raising event may have a 
community-building objective as well as a financial one.  And a mainstream mission-
focused activity such as providing day care for young children may be counted on to 
produce a certain level of revenues as well as to achieve a social goal.  In all cases, 
however, the nonprofit manager must deal explicitly with the balance of financial and 
mission goals and the tensions between them, in order to determine how best to maximize 
mission impact.  Thus, while the double bottom line rationale is dubious for the 
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organization as a whole, it commonly applies in some way to the components of activity 
that make up the nonprofit’s overall portfolio of activity.  In the next section we examine 
how this tension plays out within the eight identified areas of nonprofit economic 
decision making. 
 
Tensions between Mission and Market 
 The tensions between mission and market manifest themselves within a nonprofit 
organization at both the operational and strategic levels.  In the former category, 
nonprofits must decide what to charge for the services they offer, whether to produce a 
given service in-house or to outsource it, whether and how to compensate the people it 
employs to carry out the work of the organization, how much to spend on activities 
intended to raise net funds, and how to allocate funds held for later expenditure or for 
investment to produce operating revenues.  At the strategic level, nonprofits must decide 
about undertaking new ventures, entering collaborations with other organizations, and 
adapting to change as represented by technological innovations such as the Internet.  The 
mission-market tension takes different forms within each of these areas of economic 
decision-making, but the tension is nonetheless pervasive. 
 Pricing.  Nonprofit organizations produce many services for which charging a fee 
is feasible.   In particular, if it is possible, at reasonable cost, to exclude people from 
consuming the service unless they pay for it, then prices may be imposed.  Such nonprofit 
services include arts performances, museum visits, social service counseling, day care, 
educational programs, health and mental health treatment services, memberships in 
YMCAs and JCCs, gift shop items and many others.  While certain nonprofit products, 
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such as policy advocacy or public art cannot be priced, a host of nonprofit services 
certainly can.  The real questions are whether prices should be charged, and if so, how 
price schedules should be designed.  The answers lie at the nexus of mission-market 
tension in nonprofit decisions affecting the financing of services. 
 From a market incentive viewpoint, any excludable nonprofit service can be 
priced in such a way as to maximize net revenues, although in some cases (e.g. high fixed 
costs and modest demand) even a profit maximizing price may result in losses (negative 
profits; see Young and Steinberg, 1995).  Given the decision to produce such a service, a 
nonprofit manager responding solely to market incentives will likely decide (a) to charge 
a price, and (b) to set prices in a manner that yields maximum net revenues.  From a 
mission viewpoint, however, the price decision could be quite different.  If charging a 
price substantially contravenes the mission or values of the organization, the mission-
driven manager may decide not to charge a price at all.  A Free Clinic that provides basic 
health care services to indigent or uninsured community residents is based on the very 
notion of free care.  An endowed museum established as a community resource may have 
a long standing tradition of free access to galleries that is considered intrinsic to its 
institutional identity.  In the same vein, recently the Salvation Army had to retreat from a 
proposal to impose modest fees for use of its homeless shelters (National Briefing, 2003). 
 In many other cases, however, the imposition of a fee is accepted.  Here, the 
mission-market tension is manifested in the nature of the pricing policy or fee schedule.  
For example, maximizing mission impact may require servicing as many clients as 
possible.  Such services may be associated with “external benefits” that accrue to society 
at large as well as to the individuals who actually consume the service.  Examples include 
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children in pre-school programs, recipients of inoculations for various diseases, clients in 
therapeutic mental health or substance abuse programming, or visitors to museum 
programs.  In such cases, mission focus favors a price lower than that which would 
maximize net revenues (Young and Steinberg, 1995). 
 Furthermore, a mission-driven pricing policy may wish to differentiate among 
alternative groups of consumers.  Fine arts organizations or institutions of higher 
education may wish to encourage younger consumers or accommodate lower income 
community residents.  Accordingly, they may wish to tailor price schedules, e.g. through 
sliding scales or other differential measures.  A net-revenue maximizing price policy 
might also employ price discrimination so as to better capture the willingness to pay of 
high demanders.  But in general, such a market responsive pricing policy would not 
reflect a prejudice to serve any particular societal group aside from those who can pay. 
 In order to resolve the mission-market tension in pricing decisions, the nonprofit 
organization must first decide the particular purpose of any given service or activity.  If 
the gift shop or facility rental program is designed solely for fund raising purposes, then 
the tension is resolved by recognizing that the rules for profit-maximizing pricing apply.  
If, on the other hand, the children’s concert series or the vaccination program is intended 
to maximize mission impact then pricing must be designed to serve the target groups and 
to maximize the net social benefits associated with consumption by those groups. 
 Often, nonprofits find it difficult to make such a clear differentiation between 
mission-serving and revenue generating programs.  In particular, some programs may 
serve both purposes.  A nonprofit might decide as a matter of policy or fiscal discipline, 
for example, to run a day care service on a break even basis.  This may be an appropriate 
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value judgment in the context of the larger picture of how the organization intends to 
maximize its overall social impact.  In essence, it says that the day care program should 
maximize its mission benefits within an imposed fiscal constraint.  Setting that constraint 
at zero profits is only one of many possible choices, depending on the availability of 
financial support from other sources. 
 Finally, it is worth observing that over time there may be homogenizing forces at 
work in nonprofit pricing practices.  Under intense competition a nonprofit must price its 
services to permit economic survival, no different from its for-profit or nonprofit 
competitors.  In particular, as traditionally nonprofit service areas open up to for-profit 
provision, or where government changes the form of its support from supply-side grants 
and contracts to demand side vouchers and reimbursements, nonprofits often lose the 
flexibility to differentiate their pricing practices from competitors in order to address 
mission-related objectives.  Nonetheless, the tension between mission and market 
remains, even if the ability to adjust to mission imperatives is highly constrained.    
 Compensation.  Like pricing decisions, mission/market tensions in staff 
compensation manifest themselves at two levels.  First, one must decide whether to 
employ paid or unpaid workers.  Second, one must determine the level of compensation 
for the paid worker. 
 From a purely market perspective, the nonprofit manager would want to pay a 
competitive wage so as to attract the best possible talent, hence to achieve the greatest 
possible organizational output per dollar allocated to staff..  However, the form of that 
“wage” can vary.  In many cases it may be efficient to employ volunteers, where wages 
effectively take the form of supervisory and other costs and the provision of non-
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pecuniary benefits sufficient to enable the nonprofit to compete for the talent it seeks.  In 
many other cases, however, nonprofits must compete with money wages and benefits in 
order to attract the talent they need.  Here too, however, nonprofits may enjoy an 
advantage that allows them to compete with lower money wage offerings than 
comparable for-profit firms must offer for the same skills.  Again, nonprofits can do this 
because of certain intangible benefits they may be able to offer, such as the opportunity to 
work for a social cause or the chance to enjoy access to certain educational or 
entertainment benefits. 
 The mission/market tension enters into compensation decisions in both subtle and 
less subtle ways.  First, the market-driven policy of paying competitive wages may screen 
for individuals who in the long run are less strongly motivated by the social mission than 
other individuals who would be willing to work for less money.  That is, by deliberately 
paying less than a fully competitive wage, nonprofits may in some cases be able to attract 
workers that are more dedicated to achieving the organization’s social mission.  The 
lower wage may, in effect, screen out those more heavily driven by material motivations.  
By focusing on mission more than money, nonprofit managers may be able to achieve 
both greater mission effectiveness and more efficient use of resources.  To a certain 
extent, this strategy is available to business sector organizations as well, i.e., good people 
may be willing to accept lower wages in order to ensure working for a socially 
responsible corporation or one engaged in an exciting area of endeavor.  However, 
business’s competitive advantage in the labor market centers on its ability to pay well.  
While a nonprofit must also pay reasonably well in order to remain competitive, its 
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relative advantage is more likely to be the less tangible benefits of addressing a worthy 
social mission or working in a collegial atmosphere.  
 Second, in some cases, even where volunteer workers are saliently less productive, 
they may be more effective in addressing mission in the long term by embodying and 
maintaining the basic values of the organization.  Girl Scout programs or Red Cross 
emergency rescue programs would simply not be the same programs without their huge 
volunteer contingents.  Decisions that focused strictly on productivity in replacing some 
volunteers with paid workers at the margin might undermine mission in the long term. 
           In sum, nonprofits often behave differently in the labor market than their profit-
making counterparts.  In some cases, such as clerical or maintenance workers, there may 
be little difference.  An organization wishing to hire someone with particular 
qualifications must pay the going wage.  In many other cases, however, such as 
professional or managerial workers, mission considerations interpose themselves in 
interesting, even counterintuitive ways – by suggesting that unpaid work or under-market 
wages can better serve mission objectives. 
 Outsourcing. In purely market terms, the decision to outsource a particular 
program or activity should be made on the basis of comparative advantage and relative 
costs of oversight.  If another supplier can perform a function more efficiently than can 
be done in-house, and if an external supplier can be trusted to carry out the work as 
promised, with “transactions costs” comparable to in-house supervision, then an 
organization can use its resources more efficiently by contracting out than by carrying out 
the work internally.  This same basic logic applies to nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations. 
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 However, from a mission point of view, the nonprofit decision maker faces 
additional complications.  In particular, the nonprofit must be very careful not to 
outsource aspects of its operation that impinge closely on its core mission.  The reason is 
that nonprofits operating in a market environment are very often built on trust.  
Outsourcing an activity closely connected with mission could undermine that trust.  This 
is what appears to have happened in the recent controversy over the King Tut 2 exhibit 
which was organized by a profit-making company – the Anshutz Entertainment Group.  
According to the New York Times editorial page (King Tut, 2004): 
“Museums often present exhibitions developed entirely by other museums.  But the 
content of this exhibition will be assembled and presented by a group whose lead 
company has nothing to do with the museum world….The museums involved – including 
the Field Museum in Chicago, the Los Angeles County Museum of Art, and perhaps the 
Brooklyn Museum of Art – will be participating in a fundamental redefinition of their 
enterprise…..the sorry irony of its packaging and presentation threatens to undermine the 
mission of cultural monuments in this country: the museums.” (p.A30).  In other words, 
the museums in this case seem to be outsourcing their core, mission-related work, that of 
curatorial selection and presentation. 
  Alternatively, a nonprofit day care center that chooses to expand by outsourcing 
some of its care to other day care suppliers in nearby communities is, in essence, lending 
its credibility and good name to the contractor.  In the event of a problem, or even if the 
outsourcing is successful but carried out without prior notification, consumers may feel a 
sense of disquiet or betrayal.  What may first appear to be an efficient market-responsive 
decision may ultimately sacrifice mission. 
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 Similar effects may be experienced in the realm of fund raising.  From a purely 
market perspective, it may be efficient for a smaller nonprofit to outsource its telephone 
campaign to a telemarketing firm.  However, some careful donors may discern whether 
the telemarketer is a hired hand reading a script or a volunteer who is actually involved 
and knowledgeable about the organization, and they may respond more positively to the 
latter.  Moreover, the engagement of a profit-making fund raising firm which takes a 
large share of the gifts as its payment may actually alienate donors, ultimately 
undermining mission impact.  In these cases, nonprofits face difficult trade-offs in terms 
of often substantial cost-savings on the one hand, and the potential alienation of donors 
(with consequent long term revenue implications) on the other. 
  In short, what may appear to be a cost-efficient outsourcing decision of a mission-
related activity may, for the nonprofit organization, be ultimately less efficient than if the 
activity were maintained in-house.  In such cases, the mission-market tension is resolved 
only by asking questions about the connections between the activity in question and the 
potential losses of trust, reputation or control that may occur under outsourcing. 
 Fund-Raising.  We have already mentioned ways in which mission-market 
tensions may arise in the context of charitable fund raising.  Fund raising is an interesting 
area to examine further because, ostensibly, fund raising should be a profit-maximizing 
activity.  Presumably, the very purpose of fund raising is to generate as much in net funds 
as possible for allocation to other organizational purposes.  That is, fund raising programs 
should be designed such that the difference between the costs of raising funds and the 
revenues raised is maximized.  However, often fund raising initiatives are not so designed, 
for reasons that include both inefficiency and mission-market tension. 
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 Inefficiency results when nonprofits fail to realize that fund raising should be 
treated as a profit maximizing exercise, equating marginal costs with marginal revenues, 
rather than trying to control or even minimize the average ratio of costs to revenues.  
However, the tendency of nonprofits to focus on average fund raising ratios or to set fund 
raising revenue targets without clear connections to fund raising costs reveals underlying 
mission-market tensions.  In particular, nonprofits are sensitive to the perceptions of 
donors, regulators, watchdog bodies and other constituencies when these groups employ 
such ratios to make judgments about efficiency or organizational integrity.  The fear is 
that less support for mission will ultimately be forthcoming if the nonprofit is not 
perceived as frugal.  Similarly, nonprofit organizations set fund raising targets because 
they work well as motivational devices, helping to encourage constituents to give or 
solicit more vigorously in order to reach the goal.  Within bounds of feasibility, higher 
targets can invoke greater energy and higher revenues, even if they come at costs that 
exceed returns at the margin.  More than that, however, collective fund raising exercises 
can build organizational morale, ultimately contributing to mission effectiveness in ways 
that are not reflected in the financial accounting of the fund raising initiative. 
 The mission/market tensions in fund raising are resolved only by appropriate 
information and educational efforts directed to donors, overseers and nonprofit 
executives and development officers.  All these groups must better understand the logic 
of fund raising to maximize net funds.  At the same time, nonprofit managers and 
development officers must also integrate the mission-related benefits of target setting and 
calculation of performance ratios into the design of their fund raising programs. 
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 Investment and Expenditure of Funds.  Like fund raising, investment of a 
nonprofit organization’s funds is an activity that easily and often appropriately responds 
to a conventional market rationale.  Particularly where nonprofits manage large 
endowments or other funds that are counted upon to generate investment revenues that 
can be used for operating purposes, the nonprofit should generally seek to generate the 
largest possible financial return, subject to its tolerance for risk.  Even in this realm, 
however, tensions arise between market incentives and mission. 
 For one thing, the division between financial management of funds and the 
expenditure of funds for program purposes within the context of a nonprofit organization 
is somewhat artificial.  Ultimately, the organization should be judged by its social impact.  
So if funds can be allocated in such a way that they have direct social impact, or social 
return, this must be weighed against the traditional alternative of maximizing financial 
return and then spending that return on conventional programming.  This is the rationale 
with which foundations allocate funds to so-called “program-related investments”, i.e., 
market ventures that incorporate social objectives and which may offer greater risk or 
lower financial return than a conventional investment.  But the tension goes further than 
this.  Is a university with a large endowment but a deteriorating physical plant better off 
allocating part of its endowment, including part of its principal, to repair and rebuilding 
rather than to financial securities?  Is a social services agency better off investing some of 
its scarce funds to upgrading the skills of its staff than to maximizing the returns on its 
bank balances? 
 There is no pat answer to these dilemmas.  However, it is clear how such 
dilemmas should be framed.  Ultimately investments should make the largest possible 
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contributions to the social mission of the organization.  Sometimes this is best done by 
maintaining the organization’s financial health and its capital infrastructure.  In other 
instances, it is best accomplished by generating investment income that can be spent on 
programming.  In still other instances, it is best done by broadening one’s definition of 
investment so that allocations to new programming and new infrastructure can be 
considered as alternative ways to maximize the organization’s social returns. 
 Institutional Collaborations.  A number of market pressures exist for nonprofit 
organizations to collaborate with other nonprofits or with profit-making corporations or 
government agencies.  Potential collaborations run the gamut from simple, one-time 
projects to full mergers.  Often, funding intermediaries such as United Ways or 
community foundations or federations encourage such collaboration in order to achieve 
perceived efficiencies or eliminate unnecessary duplication of services.  In addition, for-
profit businesses often seek nonprofit partners as an element in their strategies to make 
the corporation more profitable.  In both of these contexts, there are usually market 
incentives that lure nonprofits with financial benefits of collaboration.  However, such 
incentives can also conflict with mission. 
 For example, consolidations of social service agencies, which might promise cost 
savings, can also undermine support by loyal constituencies of the partner organizations, 
such as community residents, board members or donors.  Or, subtle but important 
differences in treatment or service approaches may be lost, with potentially detrimental 
impacts on effectiveness.  These are some of the reasons why nonprofits often resist 
collaborations of a radical nature such as full mergers.  Sometimes such collaborations 
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are justified in a full economic sense, financially and programmatically.  But sometime 
they are not. 
 Corporate collaborations can be even more perplexing because the financial gains 
to nonprofits may be highly tempting while the mission risks can be subtle.  There are 
certainly a number of significant market benefits that may follow from corporate 
collaborations – including financial assistance, in-kind goods and services, consulting and 
management expertise, and marketing benefits.  Often these benefits contribute directly 
to mission effectiveness, for example, by increasing a charity’s visibility through a 
corporate marketing campaign.  However, what nonprofits often bring to the table in 
these collaborations are their good names.  Thus, if the corporate partner proves unethical 
or in some way undermines what the nonprofit is trying to accomplish, the collaboration 
may conflict with the nonprofit’s mission effectiveness by diminishing its credibility.  
Thus, the American Medical Association’s disastrous proposed collaboration with 
Sunbeam or AARP’s controversial arrangements with insurance companies threatened to 
seriously undercut the effectiveness of these organizations (Weisbrod, 1998). 
 One issue that arises in these situations is the number and depth of collaborations 
a nonprofit proposes to undertake.  Market incentives push in the direction of pursuing 
only one or at most a few intensive collaborations.  This approach minimizes the costs of 
negotiating, administering, participating and monitoring such arrangements.  In addition, 
more “exclusive” collaborations are likely to be more remunerative.  For example, the 
arrangements that the American Lung Association or the American Cancer Society have 
made with pharmaceutical companies involve the approval of particular brands of 
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tobacco patches, not tobacco patches in general.  These deals also involve very 
substantial financial payments from the companies to the charities (Weisbrod, 1998). 
 However, such arrangements put the charities at some risk of undermining their 
missions or organizational integrity.  If the products prove unreliable or harmful or if the 
companies engage in unethical or illegal practices, the charities will incur serious damage.  
On the other hand, a more diversified approach may be less remunerative.  For example, 
the American Heart Association authorizes use of its “heart healthy” seal to many 
companies, to attach to particular products, for a modest fee.  However, should one of 
these products encounter problems it is unlikely that the Heart Association’s overall 
reputation or integrity will suffer, given the larger context. 
 The resolution of mission-market tensions that surround institutional 
collaborations requires due diligence by the charity in investigating potential partners and 
associated products, clarity with respect to the motivations of those partners, careful 
exploration of the mission-related benefits and risks of collaboration, and a 
diversification strategy that will ensure that the nonprofit’s welfare is not tied irrevocably 
to that of its partners. 
 New Ventures.   Nonprofit organizations may undertake new programs or 
activities for different reasons.  New initiatives may be pursued to address mission-
related objectives, or to generate net funding for the organization, or both.  It is common 
for nonprofits to distinguish between their core, mission-related initiatives and 
commercial ventures intended to raise net funds.  Often, however, the distinction is not 
clear cut – mission-related services can make money, and so-called social enterprises 
may be worthwhile even if they are not profitable.  Hence, with every new venture 
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decision, a nonprofit is potentially faced with resolving a mission-market tension:  To 
what extent is the venture intended to pay for itself or to generate surpluses that can help 
finance other organizational activities, and to what extent does the venture generate 
mission-related benefits that should be pursued in their own right within constraints of 
financial feasibility?  Too often perhaps, this question is obfuscated when nonprofits fail 
to do a careful job of monitoring costs and calculating profits  - in which case they may 
believe they are addressing social objectives while running a profit or breaking even.  
However, researchers have found that in many cases, a proper accounting of costs would 
show that so-called profitable social ventures lose money (Foster and Bradach, 2005). 
 The intrinsic problem with new ventures is that they often have the potential for 
achieving both financial and mission-related objectives, but not necessarily both at the 
same time.  For example, a pre-school program can appeal to a well-to-do clientele and 
set its prices at a level which maximizes profits, or it can take account of social benefits 
associated with educating children from lower income families by providing subsidies or 
reducing prices.  Or, a small business enterprise, such as a beauty shop or a bakery, 
undertaken by a community nonprofit organization, could hire the most cost/effective 
workers to make its product, in order to maximize its profits, or it could hire local ex-
offenders and teach them skills on the job, perhaps losing money but helping to address 
social needs. 
 In order to resolve such mission/market tensions, a nonprofit organization must 
address its portfolio of programs at the strategic level.  That is, it needs to have a balance 
of mission-focused and financially successful programs such that, in total, it is able to 
address its social mission with maximum impact.  Some initiatives best contribute to the 
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latter goal by generating net financial resources.  Others do so by directly impacting 
mission.  Still others can be both remunerative and mission-impacting.     The point is 
that resolving mission-market tension may be different in each case.  What is required is 
an overall portfolio scheme that allows the nonprofit to develop in advance the 
appropriate criterion by which to choose and judge new initiatives by specifying where 
each initiative is supposed to fit into the organization’s mission/profitability tableau.  
This in turn will permit the organization to design appropriate pricing and marketing 
policies so that the venture can be maximally effective according to the criterion selected 
for it. 
 e-Commerce.  Activity on the Internet is not really a separate domain of nonprofit 
economic decision making but rather a new medium through which mission market 
tensions are experienced along all of the above dimensions: pricing, outsourcing, 
collaboration, employee compensation, new ventures, fund raising and investment.  What 
is different about the Internet environment is that it may be changing the nature of 
nonprofits’ competitive advantage vis-à-vis for-profit competitors.  In particular, the 
Internet provides a richer information environment for consumers of services.  
Traditionally, nonprofits enjoy a competitive advantage in many services because 
consumers are willing to trust nonprofits more than for-profits where they face an 
information deficit or asymmetry (Hansmann, 1987).  As this information disadvantage 
decreases, presumably so does the nonprofit advantage (Te’eni and Young, 2003).  This 
presents a new kind of mission-market dilemma for nonprofits.  Should they intensify 
their competition with for-profits in their core service areas or should they withdraw as 
consumers find it more satisfactory to use for-profit providers?  To compete more 
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aggressively risks becoming more like for-profits themselves, or possibly losing the 
competition (Young  and Steinberg, 1995).  However, withdrawal may mean redefining 
mission or the means through which it is addressed. 
 It is not obvious how to resolve this tension except to note the importance of 
remaining true to mission, even if that means losing the competition.  However, another 
approach is suggested by the nature of the Internet environment itself.  This environment 
is information rich and tends to deluge consumer with information which in turn may be 
difficult for vulnerable consumers to absorb or put into perspective.  This suggests a 
potentially new role for nonprofits as trustworthy “information intermediaries” (Te’eni 
and Young, 2003). 
 
An Illustrative Example 
 In order to bring all these dimensions of mission-market tension together it is 
helpful to consider questions that arise in the context of a hypothetical but realistic 
example.  Consider Save the Penguins, an environmental advocacy organization that 
seeks to protect penguins by preserving their natural habitats.  The organization addresses 
its mission by educating the general public about penguins and taking public policy 
positions on environmental issues. 
 Save the Penguins is considering the development and sale of a series of 
educational pamphlets about the life of penguins and their place in the natural ecology.  
In order to make wise decisions about this proposed initiative, Save the Penguins must 
answer a number of questions which resolve the mission vs. market tensions intrinsic to 
this initiative: 
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- Is the purpose of this venture to make a profit which can be used to support 
other activities of the organization, or is it to address the mission directly, or 
both?  If both, in what combination? 
- Should the project be outsourced to a vendor or carried on internally?  The 
answer will depend on the relative costs of in- vs. out-of-house production and 
the transactions costs of administering each, as well as how closely the 
activity is thought to relate to the core mission of the organization. 
- If the project is run internally, should it be staffed with workers at competitive 
wages or should it employ volunteers or staff willing to work for less than 
market wages?  If the initiative is considered a core activity, it might be more 
suitable for volunteers or lower paid workers who are willing to sacrifice 
wages in order to contribute to mission. 
- How should the pamphlets be priced?  If the purpose is to make money, 
pricing should be set to maximize profits.  If the purpose is to educate the 
general public or to influence policy makers, prices might be set lower than 
the profit maximizing price or the pamphlets might indeed be distributed for 
free.  Alternatively, if the project entails a mix of profit and mission objectives, 
prices might be set to break even. 
- Suppose one or more profit-making travel and tourism companies were 
willing to collaborate on the project in exchange for using Save the Penguins’s 
name on their promotional literature?  Should Save the Penguins enter such a 
partnership, and if so, under what conditions?  How many such partnerships 
would be sensible?  Association with the wrong corporate partner might cause 
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substantial damage to mission, while dealing with too many partners might be 
financially dubious. 
- How much of Save the Penguins’s investment funds should be allocated to 
this venture?  This would depend on the expected financial and social returns 
compared to other investments the organization could make with those funds. 
- Can Save the Penguins raise new funds for the venture?  If so, how much 
should be expended on this fund raising effort?  The answer will depend on 
whether that effort is considered in purely financial terms or if it would 
incorporate mission-related objectives such as the engagement of new 
volunteers and conservation advocates. 
- To what extent should the Internet be used as a medium for the publication 
and dissemination of the pamphlets, or for the prospective fund raising effort?  
Would Save the Penguins have any competitive advantage in this domain, 
relative to other sources of information about penguins?  Indeed, would the 
organization be better off serving as an information intermediary on penguins 
rather than as a direct provider of this information? 
As this series of questions demonstrates, the mission market tension pervades practically 
every aspect of Save the Penguins’s decision to undertake the proposed new venture.  
Nor does this example contain anything atypical of the spectrum of economic decisions 
that most nonprofit organizations face on a continuing basis. 
 Awareness of financial/mission trade-offs implicit in such decisions is one step 
towards resolving them in an effective way.  However, as considered below, this 
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discussion also highlights various areas where research could improve the quality of 
nonprofit economic decision making. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper argues that in principle, it is clear that nonprofit organizations should 
ultimately judge their performance in terms of impact on social mission.  Nonetheless, 
because nonprofits operate in a market environment, tensions between responding to the 
incentives of the marketplace and addressing the mission pervade virtually all dimensions 
of their economic decision making.  In order to deal effectively with these tensions, 
nonprofits must therefore analyze both the direct and indirect mission impacts of any 
initiative.  The latter may be positive or negative. For example, profits generated may be 
used to advance mission-related activity.  Moreover, market-based activity, such as 
engaging challenged workers in a for-profit business, can contribute directly to mission.  
At the same time, attention solely to market success can restrict mission achievement or 
indeed negatively impact mission-related goals. 
 The richness and complexity of this subject matter suggests this it is fertile for 
future research.  Two particular dimensions of such research stand out.  First, there is a 
need for appropriate metrics that would help guide nonprofits through these murky waters.  
How can the bottom line of mission achievement be measured in a way that helps the 
nonprofit manager make the appropriate trade-offs at the operational level?  Such a 
metric would have two components: a direct measure of mission impact framed in terms 
of social benefit, and an indirect measure framed in terms of the mission-related social 
benefits that would be generated by a financial gain or the opportunity cost in lost social 
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benefits implied by a financial loss.  As noted earlier, the problem with “double-bottom 
line” thinking is that it fails to reconcile the financial and social dimensions of 
performance.  Metrics that would bring the two together, and which could then be 
adapted to a variety of nonprofit economic decisions, would be an important step forward. 
 In the context of such metrics, a future research agenda could also include 
detailed theoretical and empirical studies of nonprofit practices in the various decision 
making realms considered in this paper – pricing, employee compensation, outsourcing, 
collaboration, investment, fund raising and so on.  In each case, alternative policy designs 
need to be analyzed to determine how each contributes to financial and program impact, 
and ultimately to the bottom line of mission impact.  For example, how do various sliding 
scale pricing schemes work to meet the financial and program objectives of nonprofit 
services in a social service or a performing arts organization?  How will various mixes of 
volunteers and paid professionals affect the mission impact of a nonprofit in an advocacy 
organization or an educational institution?  And so on.  By framing a research agenda in 
these terms, the potential exists not only for a rich scholarly literature but one that can 
inform nonprofit decision makers on the critical resource-related issues they will face into 
the indefinite future. 
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